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DIMINISHMENT OF INDIAN RESERVATIONS:
LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL FIAT?*
MR. GRIJALVA:I Thank you to all the hearty souls who came here
at four o'clock and stayed thereafter. This is the Diminishment of
Indian Reservations panel, and it starts to address more directly some of
the issues that raise or at least provide the foundation for the panels you
heard this morning. Most of the body of federal Indian law stems out of
the reality that there are these things called "Indian reservations" in the
United States. Several years ago, I was involved in a land planners
conference and one of the co-presenters was a planner from the Colville
Indian Nation, Mike Marschand, and Mike had a hobby of collecting old
maps. He was interested in old maps of the territory we now know as the
United States. And he told the audience at the panel presentation about
how the turn-of-the-century maps and some of the early 1900s maps
always had these blank spots on the maps; that there would be streams
and moutains and trees and little things and then there would be this
white blotch, this almost literal hole in the map. Those "holes" were
Indian country or in some cases Indian reservations. And the analogy
he drew was to the early maritime explorers where, you know, once they
had explored a territory, they would chart out the area, the reefs and the
coves, et cetera, all the features that made sense to sailors at the time. But
there was an area beyond which nobody had ever gone. And Mike
explained that on most of those early maps the way they represented that
was simply to draw in dragons or sea serpents or some other similar
scary feature to suggest nobody really knows what's beyond here. It
might be the edge of the world. It might be a sea serpent that would eat
your boat or your sailors. So the implicit assumption was don't go into
this area. And Mike likened that to the kind of maps that showed Indian
reservations as this white blotch, this place where nobody really knew
what was inside the boundary. And that was true for a period of time.
Later there were several policies, one in particular, the allotment
policy, of the federal government back at the turn of the century that
took what previously might be called "islands of territory," territory
that was predominantly Indian, inside the boundaries and opened that
* The following are edited proceedings from the North Dakota Law Review Symposium
Conference. Held at the University of North Dakota on April 21, 1995, this panel discussion was
premised on Robert Laurence's article entitled The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by
Judicial,as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting
Both. 71 N.D. L. REv. 393 (1995).
1. Assistant Professor of Law the University of North Dakota School of Law in Grand Forks,
North Dakota where he teaches American Indian Law, Environmental Law, Administrative Law, and
Intellectual Property.
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territory up for one reason or another to the presence of non-Indians.
And the presence of non-Indians within the boundaries of the reservation caused at least a natural reaction, which was to ask a question.
Tribal governments like all governments have an inherent responsibility
to their citizenry to protect their citizens from the potential health risk,
the health and welfare of these citizens. And the question was, where we
have these noncitizens, these non-Indians, within our boundaries, do we
as government have any control over their activities, their activities that
may harm or affect or risk the health and welfare of our natural
resources, of our environment, and of our citizens?
The question that we talk about in this afternoon's panel is really
the aftermath of the allotment period and also other policies of the
United States that allow the presence of non-Indians within the
boundaries of Indian reservation and what the Supreme Court has done
in terms of grappling with the notion of what exactly is the result when
there are non-Indians on the reservation. Is this still an Indian
reservation as everyone thought it was? Is it something different? Have
the lines changed? Or are the lines the same with something different
happening within the lines?
Our first presenter has already been introduced, Robert Laurence
from the University of Arkansas. And he's going to present the main
foundation for the panel, and I'll turn it over to Bob now. Thank you.
PRESENTATION BY ROBERT LAURENCE

The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial,
as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat, and the Ironic Role of the
Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both.
MR. GRIJALVA: Thank you, Professor Laurence. We have four
panelists and I realize it looks like three but my best information is our
fourth panelist is on his way from the airport. Briefly to Professor
Laurence's left we have Professor Frank Pommersheim from the
University of South Dakota, you've already met Professor N. Bruce
Duthu from Vermont Law School, and to his left is Alex Skibine from
the University of Utah. We're going to start with Professor Skibine who
received his B.A. from Tufts University in 1973 and his J.D. from
Northwestern in 1983.
MR. SKIBINE: I will say this about Professor Laurence's paper. I
agree with him that Hagen is a better decision than Bourland. Bourland
is a horrible decision that cannot be justified except for the fact that it
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was written by Justice Thomas who has adopted Justice Steven's view of
indian sovereignty. Remember that Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting
opinion in Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe2 where he took the position
that tribal self-government and sovereignty could not justify the tribe's
right to tax non-Indians. The tribe, according to Stevens, could only rely
on the right to exclude in order to tax the non-Indians.
Having stated that, the fact that we consider Hagen a more
justifiable decision than Bourland does not make Bourland a good
decision. We should not think that, somehow, the Indians got a better
deal in Hagen than they got in Bourland. Although some may take the
position that as precedents go, Hagen is less harmful from the Indian
point of view than Bourland, I am not sure about that either. Let me
explain why.
Under previous decisions, the Court has to find "clear indications
of congressional intent" before holding that a reservation has been
disestablished. Although the Court in Hagen purported to find "clear
indications of congressional intent" to disestablish the reservation, the
mental gymnastics the Justices had to do in order to find this "clear"
intent indicates that the intent was anything but clear. Invigorated by the
Hagen decision, the State of Utah is already challenging other parts of
the reservation as having been disestablished. The States's thinking here
is that if the Court can find clear indications of congressional intent in
Hagen, it should have no trouble finding "clear indications" in other
cases where a reservation was opened up for settlement by non-Indians.
I believe that the problem lies in the methodology used by the
Court to find "clear indications of congressional intent." A test first
formulated in Solem v. Bartlett.3 Any test that starts by saying that it is
looking for "clear" indications of congressional intent and then lists as
a factor in determining the clear intent the present day demographics of
the reservation cannot legitimately talk in terms of clear indications of
congressional intent.
Before the decision came down, I had a feeling that the Indians
would lose the case. My feeling was derived from two factors: the first
one was the demographics of the present day reservation, the second was
the current composition of the Court. So I wrote an essay in the Journal
of Contemporary Law at the University of Utah. The tile of the essay
was Removing Race Sensitive Issues from the Political Forum or Using
the Judiciary to Implicitly Take Someone's Country. The first paragraph
of the essay reads as follows:

2. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
3. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
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Now that the Israelis and the Palestinians are finally willing to
talk to each other, one is to wonder who will have jurisdiction
over the Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Although Israel
seems willing to recognize some Palestinian territorial
sovereignty in the West Bank, it is unlikely that Israel will
automatically recognize full Palestinian sovereignty over the
Jewish settlements. Should the Israeli Supreme Court decide
the issue by determining whether the Israeli Knesset, when it
allowed the settlements, intended to disestablish the West Bank
as a political unit and integrate it in the rest of Israel. Nobody
would ever suggest that this is how you should resolve this
issue .4
Yet this is exactly how the Court resolved the issue in Hagen. The
Court asked "what did Congress have in mind when they allowed
non-Indians in 1902 to come into the Utes' Country?" Needless to say,
Congress in 1902 was not kind to Indians. It was engaged in an effort to
assimilate the Indians into the rest of the United States population by
breaking up their tribal land base and giving this land to non-Indians.
Some have called this policy genocidal. By looking at congressional
intent derived from the. early 1900s to decide present day issues, are we
not reviving these former colonial type policies and hiding behind them
even though they have long been discredited? Would anyone cite as
authority the racist policies of nineteenth century congresses to
determine the present day rights of African Americans?
The correct rule should be that if in 1902, the Ute Chiefs could not
from a simple reading of the act determine with certainty that their
reservation had been disestablished, then it should not be held to have
been disestablished. If the 1902 Act had been a treaty, the Court would
look at what the understanding of the Indians was at the time the treaty
was signed. It would also resolve all ambiguities in favor of the Indians.
Why should this 1902 Act be interpreted any differently than a treaty?
The 1902 Act originally did have a provision for the Indians to consent
to the opening of their reservation. The consent provision was removed
when the Act was amended in 1905. The reason for the removal of the
consent provision was that the Court in 1903 decided Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock5 where it held that Congress could abrogate treaties previously
made with the Indian tribes without requiring the consent of the tribes.
4. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Removing Race Sensitive Issues from the PoliticalForum or Using the
Judiciaryto Implicitly Take Someone's Country, 20 J. CoNTEMP. L. 1 (1994).
5. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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Is this is enough of a reason not to have rules of treaty interpretations be applicable to the 1902 Act? I do not think so.
I believe that the Court should have recognized that there were
ambiguities and should have resolved the matter in favor of the Indians.
This would have thrown the ball back to Congress. If Congress feels that
there are some problems with tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
Congress should revisit the issue and make clear either what it meant in
1902, or better, it should implement legislation which would make more
sense in today's world. In effect, I was hoping that after the Supreme
Court of Utah decision came down, the Tribe and the State could sit
down together and negotiate a deal. In my Utah Journal of Contemporary Law essay, I suggest that the state of Utah could have started the
negotiation by stating something along the following lines:
All right, we now have a decision from the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in favor of the Utes and one from the Utah
Supreme Court in favor of the state of Utah. We all know what
is at stake here. Who has jurisdiction over the lands originally
set aside for the exclusive use of the Ute Tribe. Unfortunately,
When Congress allowed non-Indians to purchase land inside
the reservation, it forgot to spell out who would have jurisdiction over these lands. We believe that it is not fair for the tribe
to continue to retain control over some of the areas which are
now owned and populated almost exclusively by non-indians.
Yet, we recognize that within other areas of the reservation, the
tribe has a legitimate governmental interest because most of the
land is owned by the tribe or its members and the areas are
either vacant or mostly populated by Indians. Let us therefore
strike a deal which would preserve both parties legitimate
governmental interests. We could then present an agreement to
our congressional delegation who would introduce legislation
in the United States Congress implementing the agreement.
This agreement would resolve once and for all the jurisdictional
issues on the Ute Indian reservation. This dialogue, of course, never
took place and now we have to live with the Hagen decision. Besides
finding clarity where there is none, decisions such as Hagen are wrong
for another reason. These decisions continue to reaffirm the validity of
cases such as Lone Wolf under which Congress can pass laws disestablishing Indian reservations without Indian consent. I believe that the
so-called "plenary" power of Congress over Indian affairs is a myth.
The Constitutional power of Congress over Indian affairs is derived from
the Commerce Power and from the treaty power. In other words, Con-
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gress has plenary power over Indian commerce and has plenary power to
sign whatever treaties it wants to sign with the tribes as long as the tribes
agree to it. But it is only by signing these treaties that Congress can
"potentially" acquire plenary power over the Indians themselves.
Without these treaties, Congress has only plenary power in commercial
matters. Therefore, Congress should not be recognized as having
plenary power to diminish these reservations if these reservations were
established by treaties or, if not established by treaties, the Indians
subsequently acquired vested title in these reservations. This is why my
idea of resolving disputes with the tribes by agreements makes more
sense.
MR. GRIJALVA: Thank you, Professor Skibine. You know, it's
difficult in 1995 to question Professor's Skibine's comment that this is a
political issue that we ought to have agreement. We have two semiindependent parties, if you will, who should come together and come to
some agreement on these important decisions. But at the turn of the
century the plenary power that Sam Deloria referred to this morning was
essentially a conception, some would say a legal fiction, that the Supreme
Court had carved out for Congress to determine unilaterally what's in
the best interest of the Indian tribes even when it doesn't seem to be in
the best interest of the Indian tribes and even when the Indian tribes
would object to the decision or the impact of it. These sorts of situations
are really the result in many instances of Congress letting non-Indians
onto the reservation without any real consideration of the impacts on the
Indian interests or any consideration of the possible consent that the
tribe might offer or might refuse.
Our next presenter is Professor Frank Pommersheim from the
University of South Dakota. He received his B.A. from Colgate
University in 1965 and his J.D. from Columbia Law School in 1968 with
an advanced degree, M.P.A., from Harvard in 1984. He is Chief Judge
of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals and an Associate
Justice with the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals. Professor
Frank Pommersheim.
MR. POMMERSHEIM: Thank you. I wanted to make two general
sets of observations. First, some background observations about the
nature of the diminishment process itself and then some specific observations about the Bourland6 case.

6. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
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First of all, there is a universe of six diminishment cases,7 (three of
which occurred in South Dakota) and in which three times the Supreme
Court found diminishment. It's important to remember that in the
context of diminishment it doesn't simply say that certain portions of a
reservation where non-Indians live are no longer part of the reservation.
Many times as is dramatically evidenced at Rosebud, for example, it
effectively has taken Indian people who thought they lived on their
reservation and told them that they don't live on their reservation. And
that particular kind of decision has incredible legal, cultural, and
psychological impact. So it's important to remember that diminishment
doesn't only affect non-Indians and jurisdictional authority. It affects
real Indian people in terms of where they're actually living. I think it's
important to keep that in mind.
When I think of the universe of the six diminishment cases, when I
think about them and teach about them, I think that they're kind of a
unique set of cases in a totally negative way, and I want to share with you
why I think they're negative. First of all, in any of the diminishment
cases that found diminishment, if the Court had applied in any genuine
manner the canons of construction, they would have had to have found
the opposite result. It's impossible to justify any diminishment decision
if the canons of construction are applied. These diminishment statutes
are rank with ambiguity and according to the canons, ambiguity is to be
resolved in favor of the Indians. But in a diminishment area that is
simply not the case because when you get to Solem, you have Justice
Marshall saying that the test goes beyond what the language of the
statute says.
Why the surrounding
Surrounding circumstances.
Okay.
circumstances in the context of the canons of construction? The
subsequent jurisdictional history, how could that possibly be relevant?
And then the capstone, of course, is demographics. It is simply totally
irrational from my point of view to say that current demographics are
relevant in determining whether Congress intended to diminish a
reservation three-quarters of a century ago. I mean, you just can't have
it that way. And if you want an accurate predictor about the results in
7. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1961) (Colville Indian Reservation in Washington;
not diminished).
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (Klamath River Reservation in California; not diminished).
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (Lake Traverse Reservation in South
Dakota; diminished).
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota;
diminished).
Solern v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota; not
diminished).
Hagen v. Utah, 114 S.Ct. 958 (1994) (Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Utah; diminished).
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the case, don't look at what the legislation says, just go to the demographics. In a diminishment case you can have absolute certainty of
result by checking out the demographics. If the demographics are
unfavorable to Indians, they will lose. And I'm hard put to see how that
could ever be a principled decision.
Again, I think this unusual process was essentially identified by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip8 in which
he admits that what is actually happening in trying to ferret out
legislative intent in the context of these turn-of-the-century statutes to
allow non-Indians to homestead on a reservation is a completely fictionalized process. And I just want to read a quotation from Justice Marshall's
dissent in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip in which he basically says this:
Congress manifested an almost complete lack of concern with
the boundary issue. The issue was of no great importance in
the early 1900s, and it was commonly assumed that all
reservations would be abolished when the trust period on
allotted 'lands expired. There was no pressure on Congress to
accelerate this timetable so long as settlers could acquire
unused land. Accordingly, Congress did not focus on the
boundary question. For the Court to find in this confusion and
indifference a clear congressional intent to disestablish a
reservation is incomprehensible.
And I think that's the definitive notion about what is actually
happening in diminishment cases. So, as I indicated before, given that
it's a highly fictionalized process, it is not surprising that demographics
are essential and indeed they're the most reliable criteria in finding
diminishment. And I think that's a very questionable practice, to put it
mildly. I think in the diminishment area, and I don't think I'm
exaggerating, maybe some of my colleagues or some of you think that I
am, I just think that the process is not a very principled one.
I want to now turn to make some observations about how I
understand the Bourland case. I found Bob's paper provocative in that
area, though, I think in some ways I disagree with it. I'm still working
with his hyphens to understand them, and I think Bob, if he's willing to
give me a private tutorial, I might accept that.
MR. POMMERSHEIM: The context of Bourland, to refer to
Bourland as involving non-Indian land, I think grants it too much and is
ultimately misleading because Bourland is not, from my point, about
8. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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non-Indian land and the tribe's loss of jurisdictional authority over
non-Indian land because obviously the word "non-Indian" means it's
owned by a non-Indian. Bourland has to do with the tribe's loss of
authority over federally-held land on a reservation. I think that's a
cardinal distinction and I don't think we should say that it involves
non-Indian land. The reason I suggest this is that Bourland, for me, is
not related to Hagen. It's not a diminishment case. It's an extension of
Montana9 because my understanding is that Montana stands for the ugly
proposition that there is no presumption of tribal sovereignty over
non-Indian fee-held land on the reservation. The notion would be, well,
when you get to Bourland, you're not talking about non-Indian land
held in fee by actual non-Indian people who homesteaded on a
reservation. You're talking about land owned by the federal government that was taken for the Oahe Dam Project.
The question, I think, in Bourland was should Montana be extended
to federally-held land on the reservation in terms of presuming that the
tribe doesn't have jurisdiction? And I don't think there was any
justification for that because one of the interesting things in Bourland is
that, in fact, the tribe was exercising jurisdiction over Indians and
exercising jurisdiction concurrently with the state over non-Indians. I
mean, that was, in fact, the working rule. And so, I think the danger of
Bourland is that it extends Montana into an area where it ought not to
apply; that is, land owned by the federal government on the reservation.
I'll suggest one distinction for making that a meaningful distinction. One of the ways-I mean, the Courts haven't thought about it this
way, but I think one possible way of thinking about Montana is to say
that when non-Indians were being allowed to homestead on the
reservation, they had the right to own property and to have a certain
bundle of property rights. Perhaps one way of thinking about what the
federal government was allowing non-Indians to have when they
homesteaded on the reservation was a certain kind of limited immunity
from tribal regulation, not that the state automatically had the right to
regulate non-Indians but just to immunize for some limited purposes
related to owning property on the reservation to free non-Indians from
potential tribal regulation. To me, that's at least a reasonable way of
conceiving of how we might think about what was happening when
non-Indians were allowed to homestead on the reservation. If you work
with that assumption, it doesn't really apply when it's the federal
government. When the federal government is the property owner,
there's no need to prevent the tribe from exercising jurisdictional
9. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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authority over both tribal members and non-Indians on that federallyheld land because non-Indians aren't property holders in the context of
being on and using that federally-held land. Since they're not private
property owners, why should they be immunized from potential tribal
regulation? I would argue that they should be subject to tribal
regulation.
I think it's important to see Bourland not in the context of
diminishment but in the context of Montana and the continual erosion,
and I really agree with Bob on this, of the ability of the tribes to at least
have the initial notion that they do have authority over non-Indians. I
mean, Montana reversed the presumption in favor of the tribes having
jurisdiction. Among other things, the real error of Montana is that it
reversed the presumption of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and put
tribes constantly on the defensive of always having to justify their
regulatory authority over non-Indians by going to the Montana
exceptions. And Bourlandjust extends this.
I'll close with a last observation about language. It's not helpful to
me to think about Bourland as involving "judicial diminishment"
because diminishment is firmly implanted in my own mind as having to
do with the boundaries of the reservation. That's what diminishment
means to me. I think if you think about Bourland as involving "judicial
diminishment," I think it is really dangerous. I think a more accurate
term, and Bob sort of provoked me to think about this, is jurisdictional
diminishment. That's what the result of Bourland is, not to reduce the
boundaries of the reservation, but to constrict the tribe's jurisdiction.
And so I think it's more accurately thought of as an example of
jurisdictional diminishment and not judicial diminishment.
In thinking about Bourland, which I've written a little bit about, I
think it's just another example of what we see in the United States
Supreme Court and that's what I regard as a sense of judicial amnesia;
that the Supreme Court is continually losing its way in being able to
think about tribal sovereignty. It no longer has any kind of working
conception about what tribal sovereignty is as a doctrinal framework to
apply to cases. It's basically gone. It started in my view to disappear in
Montana, and Bourland is just a further extension. The real risk is that
pretty soon it will just be applied uniformly to non-Indians wherever
they are on the reservation. Unless the Supreme Court comes back to
having some kind of doctrinal footing for thinking about tribal
sovereignty and how you deploy the doctrine and actually thinking
about real cases, one can't be optimistic about the future.
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I think we're on a very dangerous line of cases in the United States
Supreme Court. I certainly don't know what the answer is except to try
to harken back, if not to the court, at least with our students and people
we work with on and off the reservation to remember that Indian law
can't survive unless there is a doctrinal understanding of what tribal
sovereignty means, at least as a core understanding. Obviously, people
can disagree at the margins, but without a meaningful doctrine of tribal
sovereignty one cannot have much hope for the field of Indian law.
And I want to encourage people to be thinking about that, writing about
it, talking about it. Thank you.
MR. GRIJALVA: Thank you. Professor Duthu from Vermont Law
School, whom you heard earlier in the trust responsibility panel, is going
to take up the issue of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
MR. DUTHU: It's hard to know where to start on an issue as
intensely divisive as this one. Professor Laurence has really written, I
think, a very provocative piece, and the part that I'm going to address is
the remedy that he calls for at the very last part of his paper and devotes,
unfortunately, just a couple of paragraphs to it without telling me very
much more about why he feels that that's really the appropriate
response. It's certainly, for those of us familiar with Professor
Laurence's writings, a familiar theme, one that he has urged before, and
that is to dissuade or perhaps to curb the Supreme Court's growing
appetite for taking big chunks out of tribal power. Maybe one of the
things we can throw at them, some Alpo to keep them from having to
turn on the tribes, would be to know that the federal courts stand ready
to police or monitor exercises of tribal power both over natives and
non-natives in an Indian Civil Rights context so we can watch over them
a little more closely. I want to examine that response very briefly for
you and begin with a point that Professor Pommersheim just made,
which is a feeling that the Court has lost its way, lost its bearings, and is
suffering from judicial amnesia. I have a different perspective on that.
If they had judicial amnesia, I could forgive them. I think they know
exactly what they're doing.
A few weeks ago, I spent some time in Washington looking through
Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers. Some of you may have already
done that as well; unfortunately, no smoking guns there. But it was very
interesting to pour through some of the tidbits of information that went
back and forth among the justices in their Indian law decisions. One of
several things I detected is a clear sense of what it is that they're doing, a
very clear sense that they understand, at least to some extent, the larger
considerations that are going on. There are some very, very interesting
dialogues or debates, and some which are actually quite petty. You may

426

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:415

be interested to know, for example, that Justice Blackmun was prepared
to dissent in an Indian law case because Justice Marshall used the term
"parameter." That shocked me, that a justice whom I had admired and
still admire, could be so dam petty. I kept looking and looking and
found an earlier memo in which Justice Blackmun said, in effect, "This
is my annual reminder that for any of you who use my least favorite
word, 'parameter,' that I will not join an opinion that uses that term."
"The mathematicians," he said, "can suffer on to themselves. We don't
have to import their confusion into the adjudication process here." At
least I had an explanation, but I still didn't understand why Justice
Blackmun would get so upset by the use of the term "parameter."
Another point that Professor Pommersheim made is that we have
difficulty finding, at least I do and my students do, finding the
beginning point for seeing when did this start unraveling? When did the
Supreme Court begin to show its animosity, this demonstrable thirst for
taking some swipes at tribal power? At an Indian law conference at NYU
several years ago, I heard the litigator, Craig Dorsey, who argued the
SmithlO case, say that among those who practiced Indian law, it was
considered malpractice to take a case that conceivably could end up in
the Supreme Court because it could "mess up Indian law for everybody
else." That was pretty intense language coming from someone who had
just gone through that experience.
Where was the beginning point? Professor Pommersheim points to
Montana.lI I find it a little bit earlier than that. We could go all the way
back to the original sin. What was the original sin? 1492? I don't
know. But for me, original enough, is 1978 with the Oliphantl2
decision. That's my beginning point in an article I wrote that looks at
that jurisprudence where the Court really manufactured a theory by
which they could limit tribal power, the theory of implicit divestiture.
We understood that Congress could divest tribes of governmental power
unilaterally or tribes could cede powers bilaterally. But in Oliphant, the
Supreme Court informed us that these were not the only two means by
which tribal powers could be divested. Tribes could also lose powers
implicitly when they exercised powers inconsistent with their status as
"dependent nations." They're "gettin' above their raisin"' as folks
back in Louisiana might say. Don't know really what that means.
There's really no basis or grounding for the theory of implicit
10. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872

(1990).
11. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
12. Oliphant v. Suquamnish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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divestiture, and, yet, we see in the very next case, 16 days later, the Court
in the Wheeler 13 decision basically expands and misreads Oliphant as
suggesting that tribal powers do not extend to nonmembers. Well, those
of you who are familiar with Wheeler know that that was pure dictum
because Wheeler did not involve nonmembers. It involved a member of
the Navajo Nation. What does Montana do? Montana converts the
dictum of Wheeler into part of its holding, and, hence, the "general
proposition" that Justice Thomas talks about in Bourland.14 So if I were
tracing it back, I would say it goes beyond Montana. It goes back to
Wheeler, and Wheeler's misreading of Oliphant. And, of course, you
can read the literature of those who have trashed Oliphant, and I won't
take this occasion to do that.
Solutions. Why the Indian Civil Rights Act as a stop gap? Well, I'm
not so sure I disagree with Professor Laurence. I'm also not so sure I
disagree with Professor Williams that the ICRA is statutorily mandated
auto-genocide. As long as a tribal court hears the footsteps of the
federal super power, ready to take a swipe for a tribal court "going
astray" and adapting its tribal court decision to suit an external
reviewing federal court, then there is a check on the exercise and the
autonomy of that tribal judicial process. And to that extent, I think it is
auto-self-genocidal in that you are not making decisions that you would
otherwise make if you were free to make them.
But maybe the ICRA doesn't go far enough. And let me offer one
proposed solution just for the sake of argument. Suppose we decided
that if the real problem that we're having in this whole endeavor is that
the Court is reluctant to expose non-Indians, nonmembers (they use
those terms sometimes interchangeably in the jurisprudence) to the
power of the tribal court, if that's the problem, why don't we pass
another removal bill? But this time we would not be removing the
Indians from the southeast or the northeast and putting them into the
center of the country. We would remove the non-Indians, give them a
certain amount of time to vacate, pay them just compensation because
we'll assume that they will have legitimate and vested interest in their
property claims, and those who choose to remain, say, after five years
would become fully subject to the power of the tribe.
The territorial component of tribal sovereignty, which the Court
sometimes points out, would actually mean something. It would mean
that everyone would have to observe and respect the territorial boundaries of the reservation. All civil and criminal matters would be subject
13. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
14. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
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to the power of the tribe. "You don't like it, here's your check. You
can move." Well, of course we know that would not happen. But I
point that out to let you know or to remind you that was exactly the kind
of solution that the Congress thought of when it was deciding on how to
rectify a land dispute between two tribes, the Hopi and the Navajo. What
do we do? We move them.
We wholesale remove individuals from their ancestral lands where
they have cultural, religious, spiritual ties to a land and say, "You're on
the wrong side of the fence because we've drawn these lines," so now
thousands of these families have to move here and a few families have to
move there. So while it may be an exaggerated option in the context of
nonmembers, it certainly was not an exaggerated option when it came to
native people.
What is my more practical solution-one that actually has a chance
to find some sensitive or receptive ears? I agree that the best option is to
have Congress pass some sort of statute which would do a number of
things. One is to confirm, and not leave it up to ad hoc judicial
adjudication, tribal authority within their territorial boundaries and say
that it is coextensive with the definition of Indian country; embodied in
18 U.S.C. § 1151, which includes all lands within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation notwithstanding the issuance of patents therein. But
we're back to the problem presented in Oliphant. Does that mean we
have to legislatively reverse the Oliphant decision? Note that Congress
did legislatively reverse the Duro v. Reina 15 decision in which the Court
had taken another bite of tribal sovereignty by holding that tribes had
been divested of criminal authority over nonmember Indians. Congress
has restored that but we know from the legislative history, as related by
Professor Deloria and others, that several senators supported the
legislation only after assurances that the Oliphant ruling would be
untouched. There is a potential constitutional problem with regard to
subjecting American citizens to the adjudicatory power of political
bodies that do not offer the full panoply of constitutional protection.
That was an issue discussed in Duro citing the Court's own precedent
involving military tribunals, and that is a concern. I don't have an
answer for that, nor do I have a definitive answer of whether or not a
legislative reversal of Oliphant is really what would cure all of these
problems. All I can tell you, and I'll close with this, is that the Congress
and the tribes need to be talking quite aggressively and assertively to
prevent the Supreme Court from simply going along the path that it
15. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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started in Oliphant, and continued in Bourland, because it is severely
damaging the ability of tribes to develop and function as governments.
Thank you.
MR. GRIJALVA: Thank you, Professor. I'm informed that
Professor Harbison did make it to North Dakota finally but it's been a
long, trying day on the airplane. He and I are going to present on the
Clean Water Act and tribal government regulation on water quality
tomorrow morning at 9:30 and we invite you back then. Thanks very
much for your attendance. We would be happy to take a question or two
if you let us stay that long.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: How did we get Hagen in the first place?
I've struggled with the procedural setting of the Hagen decision in light
of State of Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe and I don't see how we got there.
Did Martin Seneca miss the boat? Did Rob Thompson miss the boat in
not raising a collateral estoppel challenge? How did we get Hagen? I'm
a Utahan. I practice out there in that area representing developers on
that reservation. I don't understand how we got Hagen in the first place,
especially now that we have the demographics test that I find so
objectionable myself.
MR. SKIBINE: I was not at the argument but somebody relayed
the argument to me. I think at one point Martin Seneca was making this
argument at the Supreme Court and Justice Rehnquist basically
dismissed the argument by saying something to the effect, "We took the
case, didn't we," kind of implying that this issue was moot, now that the
Supreme Court had decided to hear the case.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Isn't there a statement saying collateral
estoppel wasn't issued or wasn't addressed and went to the merits? That
really bothered me.
MR. LAURENCE: I think Alex is probably right. I mean, once the
Court has taken cert, you know what they think about the Tenth Circuit
opinion, so you're probably wasting your time arguing. You know they
could have denied cert and left the Tenth Circuit decision stand. They
do say it wasn't raised below. I don't know if it was raised below. If
you're asking why wasn't it raised below, I don't know.
I think the most interesting part of it is that the tribe asked to
intervene and they were denied the right to intervene. And that struck
me as odd, although I suppose that intervention in a criminal case would
be unusual procedurally. But there's something very ironic about the
Supreme Court talking about the statements made by the tribe back in
1902 and 1903 at the very same time they won't let the tribe participate
in 1995. Now that strikes me as odd.
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MR. POMMERSHEIM: It's interesting if you go back to the
opinion actually in a collateral case before the Utah Supreme Court,
there is a dissent, by I think Justice Zimmerman, sort of raising this
question of how the majority could fly in the face of the Tenth Circuit
decision that basic federal principles apply. One would think that a state
supreme court would be obligated to follow the Tenth Circuit's
construction of federal law and federal Indian law to boot. And this was
an individual sort of criminal defendant and Justice Zimmerman in his
dissent comments on his brief, which only had two pages that dealt with
the diminishment question, and Justice Zimmerman said that he tried to
encourage the tribe to intervene and they finally did but they apparently
thought that the diminishment question was not a real issue but one of
the main issues was whether this defendant was actually Indian. And
they apparently devoted a good deal of their brief about whether this
criminal defendant was Indian. Didn't say anything really about the
diminishment question. Justice Zimmerman said he tried to get the
Justice Department to come in. They were very reluctant. When they
finally did, what they submitted was their brief in opposition to cert.
from five to ten years ago. They didn't offer anything contemporaneous. So Justice Zimmerman's dissent, I think, is a really strong statement
that this thing was artfully, or not so artfully, maneuvered to achieve the
exact result that it did and the fact that the Supreme Court not only
accepted cert but made the decision it did is all the more shocking.
MR. SKIBINE: On the other hand, this was a case where petition
for cert was filed from the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court looked
at it and denied it in 1985.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: A question on another line. Looking at
the distinction that's been drawn here between non-Indian-reservation
land and non-Indian reservation land, we tend to look at that distinction
with reference to non-Indian parcels. This whole discussion has been
focused that way on jurisdiction over non-Indians. In some ways isn't
the distinction under present doctrine, however bad it may be, an
important distinction with respect to jurisdiction over members as
between those two patterns? And if I'm right about that, then doesn't
that suggest a significant component of territoriality rather than
ownership to tribal-and I wanted to use the next word importa
ntly -sovereignty? And doesn't it then provide us a window of how to
get back to Professor Pommersheim's observation, which is if tribes have
sovereignty over the territory of their reservation, whoever owns it for
their members, how did they lose it for other folks?

1995]

DIMISHMENT OF INDIAN RESERVATIONS

MR. LAURENCE: That seems to me to be consistent with Frank's
major criticism of what I said. And so maybe this is a response to both
of them, although it surely taxes your patience I think to stay. I'm
impressed that there are this many people sitting here at twenty minutes
to six. Thanks.
MR. DUTHU: You're not going to get out of answering.
MR. LAURENCE: I think the Oliphant-Duro-Montana-Bourland
line is the most destructive line of current Supreme Court cases, at least
from the view from my non-Indian office off reservation. I don't know
what people are thinking on reservation, but to me that's a pretty
damaging line. I call it "judicial diminishment" partly to try to
embarrass the Court into seeing what it's doing; that it is preempting
under common law something that Congress can do if it wants. And it
used to do it, at least in the six cases under discussion, and assuming the
proper construction of the early homesteading statutes. And if that's the
way Congress used to do it, that is, in homesteading statutes, then it
hasn't done it very often, not very recently. But my notion that what
they're doing with the Oliphant-Bourland line (and I certainly agree
with Frank that Bourland extends Montana.l6 ) is preempting under
common law something that Congress can do if it wants to, and which it
hasn't wanted to very often lately. And so my trying to draw those two
together is partly an attempt to wake up the observer-not the observers-we're all awake-the judges to see the similarity in the results that
they are reaching under common law, and how demeaning that is it to
the legislative process that Congress by and large is choosing not to
exercise these days.
MR. POMMERSHEIM: I think one of the things that Bob said in
his paper that is really important and I think it's a given for a lot of
teachers and writers in the field is that, really, sovereignty has to be
coextensive with territory or it's not any kind of general sovereignty. If
it's limited to only certain kinds of places over certain kinds of
individuals, it's by definition incomplete and inadequate sovereignty.
When we talk about sovereignty, it has to be coextensivewith reservation
boundaries.
MR. DUTHU: I would just add that I think for me the diminishment or the beginning of the end in terms of where tribes are losing
power over non-Indians is when tribes become quite aggressive in
asserting their sovereignty, beginning to play the role of government.

16. In my paper. I say that Bourland did not extend Montana since the case was remanded to
apply the 'Montana exception.' But Professor Pommersheim here makes a different point, that
Bourland extends Montana by applying it to government land. He is surely right.
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And the Court, without any clear conception of its theory of tribal
sovereignty, is responding with suspicion that the tribal courts are simply
not going to be able to afford a measure of justice that we have come to
expect in both the state and the federal courts. Never mind, as folks have
pointed out in their scholarship, that the states did not come on board in
terms of being held to the same constitutional standards that the federal
courts are held to up until the '60s when you start looking at the
incorporation of various constitutional rights as binding upon the states
and yet we demand that those protections be extended right away by the
tribes. As Professor Monette pointed out, the opportunity for tribes to
exercise, truly exercise, their governmental powers is circumscribed by
this inability to give tribes time to make the same mistakes that all
governments have made. They just made them very early by comparison, and yet tribes are not given this opportunity to experiment.
MR. GRIJALVA: We'll revisit that theme in the morning with the
Clean Water Act presentation but thank you all for staying. We
reconvene tomorrow morning at 9 a.m. Thank you very much.

